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Abstract- As the most wide-area industrial network, the 
power system can be modeled as a graph with edges and 
vertices, which represent the lines and buses of the power grid 
respectively. Further methodologies such as complex network 
theory may help in identifying the vulnerability of power grid, 
analyzing the contingency, preventing cascading blackouts and 
so on. When power system is integrated with distributed 
generation (DG), decentralized generation at distribution level 
replaces some of the centralized generation at transmission level. 
DG units are able to improve the reliability of the power system, 
shorten the electrical distance between the sources and loads, 
alleviate the long-distance large-capacity transmission, and 
increase the efficiency. This paper proposes several vulnerability 
indices, such as structural vulnerability index (SVI), contingency 
vulnerability index (CVI) and operational vulnerability index 
(OVI) to evaluate the impact of DG to power system 
vulnerability. The simulation in DIgSILENT/PowerFactory is 
conducted to assess the vulnerability of a 93-bus test power 
system, identify the vulnerable lines and buses, evaluate the 
improvement of the vulnerability index when the network is 
integrated with DG units, and may further to optimize the 
planning DG units in the future. 
 
Index Terms—Complex network theory, contingency 
vulnerability index, distribution generation, operational 
vulnerability index, structural vulnerability index. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The networks of power system, often called power grids, 
have been regarded as one of the most important 
infrastructures whose security should be paid more and more 
concern. However, in recent years, several large blackouts 
occurred in USA and Europe, which have resulted in direct 
loss up to billions of dollars [1-3]. These blackouts expose the 
potential problems of current analysis methods for power 
systems. So far, most work of power system analysis has 
focused on only one aspect of such blackouts. Although, 
these approaches have made impressive advances in the 
understanding of each aspect, such as voltage stability 
analysis, transient stability analysis and frequency stability 
analysis, it does not provide a framework for understanding 
the overall phenomena. It is reasonable to go beyond these 
traditional deterministic bottom-up descriptions, instead to be 
in favour of statistical top-down approaches. The 
vulnerability is the ability of a network continuing to provide 
key services during random failures or intentional attacks. 
Further technology, i.e. complex network theory provides a 
feasible way to study the vulnerability of power grids, which 
has drawn the link between the topological structure and the 
vulnerability of networks [4]. 
The first systematic study about complex network theory 
appeared in late 1990s, having the goal of studying the 
properties of large networks that behave as complex systems 
[5-8]. Complex network theory has received considerable 
attention recently since the investigation of the small-world 
networks [5] and the scale-free networks [7], as their 
characteristics have been discovered in many real networks 
including power grids. With its recent considerable progress, 
complex network theory can be of interest in assessing the 
vulnerability of power grids [9-14]. The concept of global 
efficiency was widely used to assess the vulnerability or 
locate critical components for networked infrastructures [16, 
17]. Furthermore, the cascading failure model was also 
directly applied to power grids analysis [18-20]. These above 
studies provided a new direction for analyzing the power 
grids. 
Although the complex network theory has made so much 
progress, few researchers have used it to explore the impact 
of large-scale DG to transmission system [21]. In case of 
Danish power system, a significant proportion of today’s 
installed capacity is decentralized generation (about 40% of 
total capacity), such as wind turbines and combined heat and 
power (CHP) units, which are mostly connected to the 
distribution system, as shown in Fig. 1 [22]. Further, more 
onshore wind farms are expected to be connected to the 
distribution system below 100kV. Compared with 
conventional power grid which is only supplied by 
centralized power plant (CPP), DG units mainly supply part 
of the local load, while contributing much less to remote 
loads. 
In Section II, some principles of complex network theory 
are introduced. In Section III, three vulnerability indices i.e. 
SVI, CVI and OVI are proposed to explore the DG impact on 
power grid. The simulation and result of a 93-bus test system 
are shown in Section IV. Section V gives concluding 
comments. 
 
Fig. 1.  Production capacities at each voltage level in western Danish power 
system [22]. 
 
II. PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEX NETWORK THEORY 
The complex network theory has gained wide acceptance 
and has been successfully applied in analysis of power 
systems. In the complex network theory, each bus of the 
power system which may be a power source or a power sink, 
can be modelled as a vertex (or node), and each transmission 
line and transformer can be modelled as an edge (or line), in 
which power flow may be transmitted between its terminal 
buses in the forward or reverse direction. 
So the power grid can be abstracted as a directed and 
weighted graph Y = {B, L, W} where B (dim{B}=NB) is the 
set of vertices (or nodes) and L (dim{L}=NL) is the set of 
edges (or lines) with an associated set of weight W. Each 
vertex Bi can be identified by i, and each edge Lij represents a 
connection going from vertex i to vertex j with associated 
weight wij [23]. 
The following efficiency index (EI) has been widely 
applied to evaluate the transmission efficiency of a power 
grid [24]. 
,
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where ng and nl represent the number of the generator and 
the number of load respectively, Vg and Vl are the sets of 
generators and the sets of loads respectively, the geodesic 
distance ( , )ij g ld i V j V∈ ∈ represents the least number of 
transmission lines in the shortest transmission path between a 
specific generator Gi and a specific load Lj. The distribution 
of geodesic distance is usually used to measure the network 
connectivity. The lower number of dij means the lower 
distance or closer connectivity between sources and loads, 
which implies the higher efficiency of the power grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
III. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT INDICES 
A. Equivalent Impedance Between Generation and Load 
In the basic circuit theory, the node current equation is used 
to compute the voltages of the nodes and the currents of 
branches in a network.  
=ZI V    (2) 
where Z is the node impedance matrix. It can be written in 
the extended form as given in (3). 
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The equivalent impedance Zeqij between generation bus i 
and load bus j can represent the difficulty in transmitting a 
unit current from bus i and bus j, as shown in Fig. 2.  
1iI =
1jI = −
1iI =
1jI = −
 
Fig. 2.  Equivalent impedance in the equivalent electrical circuit. 
 
Assuming a unit current is injected at bus i and withdrawn 
at bus j, while no other current is injected or withdrawn at 
other buses. 
1iI =  and 1jI = −    (4) 
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So the equivalent impedance Zeqij can be calculated as 
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where zij is the ith, jth element of the impedance matrix. 
B. Structural Vulnerability Index (SVI) 
The efficiency index EI in (1) assumes that the electric 
power is only transmitted through the shortest path, in which 
ijd  does not represent the electrical characteristic. However, 
this assumption may be far away from the reality in power 
systems. The power flow from a specific generation at bus i 
to a specific load at bus j is distributed all over various 
transmission lines as determined by topology and electrical 
performance in the network. 
Besides, the capacity of generator and the load in (1) are 
not considered, which should act as the weight of the 
transmission relationship from the generation i and a load j.  
From the structural point of view, the main factors of the 
power system vulnerability should be based on the inherent 
characteristics, such as the topological relationship, the 
impedance of the transmission lines and transformers as well 
as the capacity of the generators. The varying power system 
operation conditions has little affect on the structural 
characteristics. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel SVI for 
power system with large amount of DG. 
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where Pgi is the capacity of generation at node i, Plj is the 
maximum load at node j, and Zijeq is the electric distance 
(equivalent impedance) between node i and node j. 
Furthermore, compared with the conventional power 
system, the power system integrated with large amount of DG 
has relative more generation capacity in the low voltage level. 
The DG mainly supports the relatively local load demand, 
contributing much less for remote loads. This characteristic is 
taken in to account for SVI in (7), where Pgi/exp(Zeqij) 
approximately represents the contribution from generation 
bus i to load bus j. The contribution from the generation to 
the load should exponentially decrease with the increase of 
the impedance between them. When the DG and load are 
connected to the same node, Zeqij=0, Pgi/exp(Zeqij) =1, which 
means that DG has the highest priority to satisfy the local 
load demand. 
So SVI is more effective and more accurate than EI as 
defined by (1) for evaluating the changes of power system 
transmission efficiency before and after integrated with DG 
units. The higher SVI means the higher the transmission 
efficiency, which was widely used to assess the vulnerability 
or locate critical components for networked infrastructures. 
C. Contingency Vulnerability Index (CVI) 
The contingency in the power system is most possibly a 
fault followed by a trip of transmission line or transformer by 
protection devices. When contingencies take place in the 
power grid, the tripping of transmission lines or transformers 
possibly result in the severe deterioration of power 
transmission performance. It is because that the deletion of 
the components increase the electrical distance between 
sources and loads. So the SVI will likely decrease after the 
removal of transmission lines or transformers. 
CVI is used to evaluate the criticality of a contingency as 
defined by (8), which is the reduction percentage of SVI 
related to the network structure variation. Furthermore, the 
decrease in the percentage of SVI in N-1 contingency can 
also be used to identify the vulnerable point in the power grid. 
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The higher CVI represents the contingency is more 
critical or the power is more vulnerable after removal of this 
component. So the operator from TSO should pay more 
attention on the contingencies in this transmission line or load 
and CVI also provides an index for preventing cascading trips. 
D. Operational Vulnerability Index (OVI) 
OVI is the index based on the operational conditions. The 
most significant impact of the DG on power grid is that to 
reduce the long-distance large-capacity power transmission 
thus to increase the power transmission efficiency. OVI is 
proposed to evaluate the operational vulnerability, as defined 
in (9). 
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where pl represents the active power in the transmission 
line l, and the impedance zl is the weight of line l. The smaller 
the OVI implies the less amount of the long-distance large-
capacity transmission for active power and high transmission 
efficiency is in the network. 
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULT 
A. Test Power System 
A 93-bus test model that representing a power system 
integrated with large amount of DG units is used to evaluate 
the effect of the DG to power system vulnerability, as shown 
in Fig. 3. The model has 124 components (edges) composed 
of 112 lines and 12 transformers. Almost every node in the 
distribution system underneath the transmission level is 
integrated with DG units, such as PV, onshore wind farms 
and CHP plants, however, 12 CPPs are connected to the 
transmission system. The test system is simulated by 
DIgSILENT/PowerFactory, in which the balanced positive 
sequence AC load flow is calculated by adjusting the power 
output of DG and CPP. 
 
Fig. 3.  The test power system. 
 
B. Structural Vulnerability Assessment 
In order to evaluate the impact of DG penetration level for 
power transmission efficiency in the structural vulnerability 
assessment, the share of DG output is gradually increased to 
replace the generation of CPP. The load is the maximum load 
of each load bus, remaining invariant before and after DG 
integration. 
As shown in Fig. 4, with the increase in the penetration 
level of DG from 0% to 100%, the SVI linearly increases 
from 0.006 to 0.021, which means that the transmission 
efficiency improves with the increase of DG penetration level. 
 
Fig. 4.  The SVI with respect to the DG penetration level. 
 
C. Contingency Vulnerability Assessment 
In order to evaluate the impact of DG on the ability of 
power system to resists the N-1 contingency, SVI is 
calculated before and after the removal of one component 
(transmission line or transformer). As shown in Fig. 5, the x-
axis shows the number of components corresponding to every 
transformers and lines in Fig. 3. It is obvious that the SVI 
integrated with 100% DG is much higher than that without 
DG before and after N-1 contingency. Besides, the decrease 
of SVI after N-1 contingency with DG is generally lower than 
that of the case without DG integration. This means the 
power grid is stronger with DG integration regarding N-1 
contingency than that without DG. This result also testifies 
that DG helps to improve the vulnerability of the power grid 
after contingencies. 
 
Fig. 5.  The SVI before and after N-1 contingency. 
 
As mentioned in the Section III, CVI can also be used to 
evaluate the criticality of a contingency. From another point 
of view, CVI helps to identify the vulnerable points of a 
power grid. As shown in Fig. 6, without DG integration, Line 
71-72, Line 42-50 and Line 16-11 are the 3 most vulnerable 
components in the power grid. They have been marked in the 
test power system in Fig. 3. The blue line in Fig.6 shows that 
the criticality of the contingencies in these 3 lines is evidently 
reduced because of DG integration, which means that the 
power system is more resistant to contingencies with DG 
integration. 
 
Fig. 6.  The CVI with and without DG integration. 
 
Fig. 7 shows the descending ordering of CVI. It is 
important to note here that, with DG integration, most of 
components have much lower CVI, but some components 
have higher CVI, which means the power grid is more 
vulnerable after contingency take places at only a few points 
after DG integration. The maximum values and mean values 
of CVI with and without DG integration are shown in Table I. 
 
Fig. 7.  The descending sort of CVI. 
 
TABLE I STATISTIC DATA OF CVI  
CVI Maximum CVI Average of CVI 
0%  DG integration 19.71% 2.49% 
100 %  DG integration 1.72% 0.38% 
Fig. 8 shows the descending ordering of CVI for the N-1 
contingency in 10 most critical components. It can be seen 
that, with DG integration, the vulnerable points in the power 
grid have been changed. 
 
Fig. 8.  The 10 most vulnerable components. 
D. Operational Vulnerability Assessment 
As mentioned earlier, the most significant impact of DG 
on power grid is to reduce the long-distance large-capacity 
power transmission. OVI is the index to evaluate the power 
transmission efficiency, meaning that the weighted average 
value of active power in all the lines and transformers, which 
is based on AC power flow. The lower OVI implies that 
lesser the transmission distance of active power, higher the 
efficiency of the network. In order to evaluate the impact of 
DG capacity to power flow pattern, the overall load should 
not be changed, and the DG penetration level is increased to 
replace the CPP output. Fig.9 shows the value of OVI with 
respect to the DG penetration level. 
With the increase penetration level of DG from 0% to 
100%, the OVI decreases from 126.66MW to 41.17MW. The 
lower active power transmission average value implies the 
lower power loss and thus the high transmission efficiency. 
 
Fig. 9.  The OVI with respect to the DG penetration level. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper proposed three vulnerability indices, structural 
vulnerability index (SVI), contingency vulnerability index 
(CVI) and operational vulnerability index (OVI). SVI is the 
index to evaluate the topological vulnerability of the whole 
power grid structure. CVI is the index to identify the 
vulnerable component in a power grid. OVI is the index 
related the operation states of power system which is based 
on power flow. 
In conclusion, the DG units are able to improve the 
reliability of the power system, shorten the electrical distance 
between the sources and loads, alleviate the long-distance 
large-capacity transmission, and increase the efficiency. 
This vulnerability evaluation based on basic complex 
network theory is also able to provide a constraint to optimize 
the planning of future DG units. Besides, in emergency 
condition of power system, these vulnerability indices based 
on load flow can also helps to prevent cascading failures. 
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